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I. Introduction 
 
 
Chaos in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and the controversy that 
continues to swirl around the public sector response have led to a broad discussion of the 
appropriate roles of various levels of government in disaster management and 
preparedness. A central theme in press and pundit accounts of what went wrong in New 
Orleans was conflict between those who argued that the disaster was attributable to local 
officials’ failure to adequately prepare for an easily predictable set of events and those 
who blamed a slow and inadequate response by federal officials (Walter and Kettl 2006).  
While recent events have brought these questions to the forefront of public 
debate, many of the same issues have arisen in previous disasters, including the 
earthquakes, hurricanes and floods that irregularly strike particular geographic areas of 
the US. Clearly, a combination of preparedness and effective response are crucial to 
minimizing the overall welfare losses from these region-specific shocks. Yet policy 
design must confront a tradeoff between efficiently allocating resources ex-ante to 
minimize potential losses, and dealing equitably with residents of regions that experience 
significant losses ex-post.  This tradeoff and its implications for the design of public 
disaster insurance are the subject of the current study. 
The problem of the public sector’s role in preparing for and responding to 
disasters has been the subject of considerable recent scholarly interest. In part, this work 
has stemmed from a belief that natural hazards have increased in their frequency and 
intensity in recent years, a belief that appears to be largely consistent with at least a 
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cursory review of the data on disaster declarations in the US.1 In addition to their 
increased frequency, Richard Zeckhauser (2006) has argued that the distribution of 
disaster losses exhibits “fat tails” – losses experienced in the worst disasters are many 
times those experienced in the second worst – implying that the most serious events may 
be expected to be extraordinarily costly.2  
Our paper is related to several strands of literature.  The existence of natural 
hazards produces risks to income flows in particular places.  One strand examines the 
role that federalist institutions can play in insuring residents of a federation against 
income loss (von Hagen 2007 provides a useful review). When shocks to regional 
incomes are imperfectly correlated, an insurance contract can be derived that transfers 
resources from regions that realize high income to those that sustain a negative shock. 
One example is when regional business cycles are not completely in phase. In such 
circumstances, a policy institution that provides a transfer to regions with strong growth 
fundamentals that are experiencing a downturn can enhance both aggregate stability and 
equity (see, for example, Bayoumi and Masson 1995). An empirical literature has sought 
to quantify the actual size of such transfers, an effort which is complicated by 
correlations in shocks across regions, by difficulty in distinguishing temporary from 
permanent shocks, and by the distinction between aggregate income and aggregate 
output. Melitz and Zumer (2002) summarize previous results and provide a well-founded 
                                               
1
 See, for example, data on Presidentially declared disasters on the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency website http://www.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema; 
last accessed June 5, 2007. Note, however, that these declarations reflect losses, which 
are jointly determined by hazards and vulnerability. 
2
 When the subject is broadened to include potential losses from terrorism - disasters 
planned and executed by intelligent opponents as compared to a relatively passive natural 
environment - the complexity and need for serious attention become even more 
pronounced.   
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estimate that central government redistribution offsets about 10 to 20 percent of shocks to 
personal income in four countries.3 Within economically developed federations, central 
government insurance is thus an important resource for regions experiencing negative 
shocks.  
A second strand emphasizes asymmetric information and the moral hazard aspects 
of intranational insurance as in Persson and Tabellini (1996).4  We adapt many features 
of Persson and Tabellini’s (1996) model to the study of natural disasters. Persson and 
Tabellini study the institutions of federalism in an economy characterized by uncertainty 
about future income in distinct regions of a federation, a situation that well describes the 
natural disaster setting. Like Persson and Tabellini, we abstract from household mobility 
and focus on sub-central governments. This focus does not imply that mobility is an 
unimportant feature of disasters. Indeed, location choice is a fundamental part of the 
process that determines vulnerability and is relevant to designing appropriate disaster 
response. Nonetheless, while residents may choose to relocate either before or after a 
disaster strikes, sub-central governments are usually defined by particular geographic 
areas and are thus fixed in place. We thus interpret our model as shedding light on the 
interplay between disaster risk and the institutions of federalism, not on the relationship 
between a central government and individuals. The latter interaction is considered by 
Kunreuther’s (2006) work on public disaster insurance for individual households and 
firms and Wildasin’s (2008b) work on federal disaster insurance with mobile households. 
                                               
3
 France, the UK, the US and Canada 
4
 Other papers that study various aspects of asymmetric information and insurance in a 
federation include Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini (2001), Caplan, Cornes, and Silva 
(2000), Raff and Wilson (1997), and Lockwood (1999). 
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A third strand of literature relates to “second generation” models of federalism as 
reviewed by Oates (2005) for instance.  This emerging literature is often characterized by 
models in which information, politics, and strategic decisions play important roles.  
Information problems, strategic interaction, and the objective of the central government 
are at the heart of our analysis, so our paper is also a contribution to this emerging body 
of literature. 
Hazards policy in the United States is a complex interplay between the federal 
and state-local sectors. Broadly speaking, state and local officials bear primary 
responsibility for minimizing vulnerability to natural hazards through policies such as 
land use regulation, investment in protective infrastructure and providing resources 
designed to enhance emergency response.  
While the federal government is involved in these activities to a limited extent 
(Corps of Engineers flood control grants are a prominent example), the bulk of federal 
resources are devoted to providing assistance to individuals and governments after 
disasters occur. Between fiscal years 1974 and 2005, Presidents declared over 1,200 
disasters in the United States, and the federal government appropriated over 80 billion 
constant FY 2005 dollars for disaster relief. As indicated in Chart 1, as the annual number 
of declared disasters has risen, the average cost per year has risen above $3 billion.  
While much of this relief was provided to individuals and businesses, a 
substantial portion takes the form of grants-in-aid to state and local governments.5 Since 
1998, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has obligated an average of 
over $2 billion per year to public sector disaster assistance. Roughly three quarters of 
                                               
5
 The federal response to disasters may also include less obvious kinds of relief, like 
relaxation of standards for poverty relief. See (Chernick 2001).  
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these expenditures have been designated for ex post emergency response and repair of 
public facilities.6 This division of responsibilities – sub-national (regional) governments 
providing protection from disasters and federal government providing insurance against 
their occurrence – leads to the tensions that are at the heart of our analysis.  
First, when the federal government is committed to full insurance against 
disasters, regions will have incentives to under-invest in protective infrastructure in a 
Nash equilibrium.  A second-best transfer scheme can be derived that reduces the under-
investment problem, but the second-best transfer scheme suffers from a time-
inconsistency problem. This highlights a second tension which is manifested in the 
timing of insurance commitments by the federal government. As indicated in Chart 1, 
more than half of the federal funds provided for disaster relief since 1990 have been the 
result of ex-post supplemental appropriations. That is, Congress has elected to 
appropriate large amounts of additional federal compensation to victims after disasters 
occur, raising questions the federal government’s ability to commit to any second-best 
transfer scheme.7  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the economy we study, 
and lays out the basic model of federalism with uncertain incomes. In this section we also 
derive the optimal insurance scheme and level of investment in protective infrastructure 
for the federation.  In section III, we derive non-cooperative regional investment levels 
for any transfer scheme and demonstrate that when individual regions act non-
cooperatively, they will under-invest relative to the first-best optimum. In section IV, we 
                                               
6
 These figures exclude the response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. That 
event alone resulted in a $7 billion Congressional appropriation. 
7
 Wildasin (2007, 2008a) suggests a mandatory disaster reserve fund as one possible 
solution to this problem. 
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derive the structure of the optimal second-best insurance system when regional 
governments choose investment levels non-cooperatively and the central government 
cannot verify regional investment choices.  Second-best transfer levels will normally be 
less than the first-best for disasters (and the corresponding non-cooperative investment 
levels greater), but there is a surprising possibility that results in greater second-best 
transfers (and smaller investment levels) when the probability of a disaster is not too 
remote and the damage not too great.  Section V shows that the central government will 
be unable to commit to the second-best transfer levels, and will instead opt for equalizing 
transfers ex-post; this leads to a type of soft budget constraint.  Regions will anticipate 
the central government action, and their exploitation of this knowledge will result in even 
further under-investment in protective infrastructure in the Nash equilibrium. Section VI 
concludes with a discussion of what the model can teach us about the federal response to 
recent disasters and those yet to come. 
 
II. First-Best Transfers and Regional Investment  
 
We begin with a simple model of a federation with two regional governments that 
are completely symmetric.  To differentiate the two regions, variables for one of the 
regions are denoted with asterisks.  Each region has certain income in period 1 and 
uncertain income in period 2.  The uncertainty results from i.i.d. shocks.  Uncertain 
income can be high with probability P or low with probability (1 – P).  A region can use 
some of its period 1 certain income (Y = *Y ) to invest in protective infrastructure, I, (e.g. 
levies or first responder training), leaving it with Y = Y - I (or analogously Y* = *Y - I) 
7
period 1 income.  This investment increases the probability of ending up with high 
income, so P is a function of I.  There are thus four joint possibilities for uncertain 
income: 
i. (YH, Y*H ) with probability P(I)P(I*) 
ii. (YH, Y*L ) with probability P(I)(1-P(I*)) 
iii. (YL, Y*H ) with probability (1-P(I))P(I*) 
iv. (YL, Y*L ) with probability (1-P(I))(1-P(I*)) 
While we differentiate the regions by use of the asterisk, it should be clear that our 
assumption of symmetry implies that each variable has the same value for the starred and 
unstarred region (e.g. YH = Y*H ; P(I) = P(I*); and so forth).  As mentioned above, the 
first derivative of P(I) is positive, P’(I) > 0.  We also assume the second derivative is 
negative, P’’(I) < 0, i.e. we assume diminishing returns in production of protection.  This 
seems an intuitively appealing assumption.  For instance, making a levee wider always 
reduces the probability that it will fail, but adding a foot to a two-foot wide levee adds 
more protection from failure than adding the same amount to one that is ten feet wide. 
 For most of the paper, we model a three step decision process. In stage one, the 
central government commits to a transfer scheme. In the second stage, regional 
governments choose an investment level in light of the announced transfer scheme. Once 
investments are in place, the state of nature is revealed (disasters, if any, occur), incomes 
are realized and the transfers committed to in the first stage are made. In the final part of 
the paper we examine the dynamic consistency of the central government’s first-stage 
transfer commitment by adding an additional stage where the central government may 
choose to revisit its transfer scheme ex-post.  
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 First-best optimal transfers for given investment levels 
Regions are assumed to be risk averse and risk sharing in the federation is 
accomplished through a set of self-funding transfers (i.e. the amount paid by one region is 
the amount received by the other).  The central government wants to choose transfers for 
each (joint) state of nature {THH , THL, TLH , TLL} where the first subscript refers to the 
state of nature of the unstarred region and the second subscript stands for the state of 
nature of the starred region.  The central government’s objective is to maximize the sum 
of expected utilities: 
{ ,  , , }
( ) ( * *)Max
( ) ( *) ( )
( )(1 ( *) ( )
(1 ( )) ( *) ( )
(1) (1 ( ))(1 ( *)) ( )
( ) ( *) ( )*
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+ − +
+ − − +
+ −
+ − +
+ − )
(1 ( ))(1 ( *)) ( )*
LH
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where we assume that period 1 and period 2 utility are additively separable.  This yields 
the set of first-order conditions: 
( ) *( * )(2) , ( , )r rs s rs
rs rs
u Y T u Y T
 = r s L H
T T
∂ + ∂ −
∈
∂ ∂
 
where u* henceforth denotes utility given the value of the starred region’s arguments.  
This set of first order conditions say that transfers should be set to equalize the marginal 
utility of transfers, or equivalently the marginal utility of income, across the two regions.  
Given declining marginal utilities, this implies that after-transfer incomes should be 
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equalized for all states of nature.  Hence, optimal transfers for a given regional 
investment level in the first-best results in full risk-sharing.  For cases (i) and (iv) above 
no transfers occur since incomes are already equal.  For cases (ii) and (iii), income is 
transferred from the region that realizes high income to the one that realizes low income.  
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal first-best transfer for case (ii) above - (YH, Y*L). 
 
First-best regional investment levels 
 Now consider the level of regional investment that maximizes the sum of 
expected utilities.  Here there is no information problem since the central government is 
able to choose investment levels directly.  In this case, the first-best optimal investment 
solves: 
, *
( ) ( * *)Max
( ) ( *) ( )
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The FOC with respect to I is: 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
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where we use the fact that THH = TLL = 0.  Analogously, the FOC with respect to I* is: 
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[ ]
[ ]
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With symmetric regions and transfers that exhibit full risk-sharing as derived above (4) 
reduces to: 
[ ] [ ](5) 2 * ( ) ( ) 2 (1 *) ( ) ( )  H L LH L H HLP P vP u u P u uY Y T Y Y TI I Y
∂ ∂ ∂
− + − − − − =
∂ ∂ ∂  
Analogously, (4*) reduces to: 
[ ] [ ]* * *(5*) 2 ( ) ( * ) 2 (1 ) ( * ) ( )  * *
* * *
H L HL L H LH
P P vP u u P u uY Y T Y Y TI I Y
∂ ∂ ∂
− + − − − − =
∂ ∂ ∂
 
Note that the implicit first-best optimal investment level for I depends on I* (through P*) 
and vice-versa; moreover, given the assumed symmetry, the first order conditions are 
identical so optimal first-best investment levels I and I* must be identical.  Note also that 
if there were no transfers the first order condition (5) would not depend on I* and would 
reduce to: 
( )(6) 2 ( )H L
P v
u Y
 u = YI Y
∂ ∂
−  ∂ ∂
 
and analogously for (5*).  The presence of the transfers has inserted an externality into 
the problem because they make it so that one region’s investment affects the utility of the 
other region. 
 
III. Non-cooperative Regional Investment 
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We now want to explore the Nash equilibrium investment levels of the two 
regions as they act non-cooperatively.  From here on we will use the symmetry of regions 
to economize on notation.  Symmetry implies that transfers paid by each region when it 
has high income and the other region has low income are the same (THL = TLH) so we 
henceforth simplify by letting T = THL = TLH.  The unstarred region’s optimal choice of 
protective investment will solve the following problem: 
( )Max
( ) ( *) ( )
(7) ( )(1 ( *) ( )
(1 ( )) ( *) ( )
(1 ( ))(1 ( *)) ( )
 I
H
H
L
L
  v Y I
 P I P I u Y
P I P I u TY
P I P I u TY
P I P I u Y
−
+
+ − −
+ − +
+ − −
 
The first order condition, which defines the reaction function for the unstarred region, is: 
[ ] [ ](8) '( ) ( *) ( ) ( ) '( )(1 ( *)) ( ) ( )H L L H YP I P I u u P I P I u u vY Y T Y Y T− + − − − − =  
The level of investment of the unstarred region depends on the level of investment of the 
starred region because of P(I*).  To derive the slope of the reaction function, write the 
reaction function defined by (8) in implicit form, ϕ(I, I*, T) = 0.  Using the implicit 
function theorem, the slope of the reaction function for the unstarred region is: 
*(9)
*
I
I
dI
dI
φ
= − φ  
Assuming that YH > YL + T, i.e. that the transfer cannot make the region hit by a negative 
shock have more income than it would have received had it gotten a positive shock, the 
sign of ϕI is negative: 
[ ] [ ](10) ''( ) ( *) ( ) ( ) ''( )(1 ( *)) ( ) ( ) 0H L L HI P I P I u u P I P I u uY Y T Y Y Tφ = − + − − − − <  
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Given that YH > YL + T, the first term in brackets is positive and since P’’(I) is negative 
the entire first term must be negative.  The second term in brackets must be negative 
given that YH – T > YL and since P’’(I) is negative (and is multiplied by -1), the entire 
second term must also be negative.  Hence, ϕI < 0.  Concavity of the utility function (i.e. 
risk aversion) implies that ϕI* is negative.  To see this, note that ϕI* is: 
[ ] [ ]*(11) '( ) '( *) ( ) ( ) '( )( '( *)) ( ) ( )
'( ) '( *)[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
H L L HI
H L L H
P I P I u u P I P I u uY Y T Y Y T
P I P I u Y u Y u Y T u Y T
φ = − + − − − −
= + − + − −
 
Since T < YH - YL,we can write T as α(YH - YL) where 0<α<1.  Hence,  
*
(11') '( ) '( *)[ ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))]
'( ) '( *)[ ( ) ( ) ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) )]
I H L L H L H H L
H L L H H L
P I P I u Y u Y u Y Y Y u Y Y Y
P I P I u Y u Y u Y Y u Y Y
φ = + − + α − − − α −
= + − − α + α − − α + α
 
Adding and subtracting αu(YH) and αu(YL) yields: 
*
(11'') '( ) '( *)[ ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) )]
I H H L L
L H H L
P I P I u Y u Y u Y u Y
u Y Y u Y Y
φ = α + − α + α + − α
− − α + α − − α + α
 
The definition of concavity states αu(YH)+ (1-α)u(YL)< u(αYH+ (1-α)YL) and αu(YL)+ 
(1-α)u(YH)< u(αYL+ (1-α)YH).  Hence, ϕI* < 0 and the slope of the reaction function is 
therefore negative. 
 An intuitive description of (8) is as follows.  The right hand side of (8) represents 
the direct marginal cost of greater investment which results in lower period 1 certain 
income and consumption.  The left hand side represents the marginal expected increase in 
period 2 utility resulting from the fact that an increase in investment increases the 
probability of ending up with YH and decreases the probability of ending up with YL.  
Comparing to the first order conditions from the first-best problem, these are the same 
except that the two left hand side terms are multiplied by two in (5).  This is because one 
region’s investment decision affects the probability of ending up in each of the four joint 
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income possibilities.  The region takes into account the effect of its investment on its own 
utility, but does not take into account the effect on the utility of the other region.  In other 
words, region 2 benefits from an increase in region 1’s probability of ending up with YH 
(holding region 2’s probabilities constant).  Region 1 ignores this benefit in its investment 
decision and invests too little in protective infrastructure from a social point of view.   
 Given the smooth concavity of the objective function, the reaction functions are 
continuous.  To make sure that the reaction functions intersect, we impose the condition 
that when a region’s investment is zero, the marginal benefit of investment for that  
region is greater than the marginal cost.  As is well know, a sufficient condition for the 
resulting Nash equilibrium to be asymptotically stable relates to the slopes of the reaction 
functions, and in particular that the absolute value of the slope is less than 1.  This 
requires ϕI* < ϕI which, using the above derivatives, requires 
[ ] [ ]
(12) '( ) '( *)[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
''( ) ( *) ( ) ( ) ''( )(1 ( *)) ( ) ( )
1 1
''( ) ( *)[ ( ) ( )(1 ) ( ) ( )(1 )]( *) ( *)
H L L H
H L L H
H L L H
P I P I u Y u Y u Y T u Y T
P I P I u u P I P I u uY Y T Y Y T
P I P I u Y u Y u Y T u Y T
P I P I
+ − + − −
< − + − − − −
= + − − + − − −
 
 Since YH – T > YL and P(I*)<1, the bracketed term in the third line associated with ϕI  is 
greater than the bracketed term in the first line associated with ϕI* .  Hence, what is 
needed to ensure asymptotic stability is that the absolute value of P’’(I)P(I*) is not too 
small relative to P’(I)P’(I*).  There are various ways of interpreting this, but the essential 
requirement is that the reaction function I(T, I*) plotted in Figure 2 needs to intersect the 
reaction function I*(T, I) from below.  That is,  the derivative of P(I) cannot diminish too 
rapidly.    An alternative way to express this is that disaster is a low frequency, high cost 
event with investment having a relatively small expected payoff so that P(I*) is large, 
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P’(I) and P’(I*) are smallish, and P’’(I) is small but greater in absolute value than 
P’(I)P’(I*)/P(I*). 
 Analogously to (8) above, the first order condition for the starred region is: 
[ ] [ ]* * *(8*) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( )* * * *
* * *
H L L H
P P vP I u u P I u uY Y T Y Y TI I Y
∂ ∂ ∂
− + − − − − =
∂ ∂ ∂
 
Solving (8*) for I* would yield the reaction function of the starred region, I*(T,I).  The 
symmetry of the problem implies that the two reaction functions are also symmetric.  
Hence, the reaction function for the starred region is also a downward sloping function of 
I  and the Nash equilibrium levels of investment (I(T), I*(T)) that simultaneously solve 
these two first order conditions would be identical for each region; we denote this Nash 
equilibrium investment level as I(T)=I*(T).  Figure 2 shows the Nash equilibrium 
graphically. 
 To summarize, the central government can offer full risk-sharing, which would be 
first-best optimal if the central government could also choose regional investment levels.  
However, if regions choose their own investment levels while the central government 
offers full risk-sharing transfers, regions acting non-cooperatively will underinvest in 
protective infrastructure. 
 
IV. Second-Best Transfers 
We have thus far shown that if the central government commits and offers first-
best optimal transfers with full risk-sharing while regions choose their investment levels 
and act non-cooperatively, regions will tend to underinvest in protective infrastructure 
from a national perspective.  Thus, first-best investment and first-best risk-sharing 
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transfers cannot both be achieved under these circumstances.  We next consider whether 
the central government can design a second-best transfer system that would achieve 
higher overall welfare.   
 As before we assume that the central government’s problem is to choose T to 
maximize the sum of expected utilities.  However, now the central government is 
assumed to know the reaction functions and Nash equilibrium investment choices I(T) = 
I*(T) so it recognizes that regions’ investment choices will depend on the transfer they 
receive.  In this case, the second-best transfers solve: 
( ( )) ( * *( ))Max
( ( )) ( *( )) ( )
( ( ))(1 ( *( )) ( )
(1 ( ( ))) ( *( )) ( )
(13) (1 ( ( )))(1 ( *( ))) ( )
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(1 ( ( ))) (
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L
L
H
L
  v Y I T v Y I T  
 P I T P I T u Y
P I T P I T u TY
P I T P I T u TY
P I T P I T u Y
P I T P I T u Y
P I T P I T u TY
P I T P
− + −
+
+ − −
+ − +
+ − −
+
+ − +
+ − *( )) ( )*
(1 ( ( )))(1 ( *( ))) ( )*
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I T u TY
P I T P I T u Y
−
+ − −
 
where I(T) = I*(T) are the Nash equilibrium investment levels and the FOC for T is: 
(14)                
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[ ]
[ ]
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* *(14.3) ( ) ( * ) *
*
H L
H L
H L
H H
u Y T u Y TP P P P
T T
P I P I
u Y T u Y T P P
I T I T
P I P I
u Y T u Y T P P
I T I T
P I P I
u Y u Y P P
I T I T
∂ − ∂ +
− = −
∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
− − + + − − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
− − + + − − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
+ + + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
[ ] * *(14.4) ( ) ( * ) (1 *) (1 )
*
*(14.5)
*
L L
P I P I
u Y u Y P P
I T I T
v I v I
I T I T


∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
− + − + − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
+ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 
16
We can simplify by using the envelope theorem, which in our context states that regions 
will always pick an investment level along their respective reaction functions so (8) and 
(8*) will be satisfied.  Using in addition the symmetry properties, the first order condition 
for T simplifies to: 
( ) ( ) 1 1(15) 2 ( ) 2 ( )
1
( ) 2 ( ) ( ) 1
1 ( )
H L
H L
L L H
L
 
u Y T u Y T P I
u Y u Y
T T I T P P
u Y T u Y u YP I P
T I T P P u Y
 ∂ − ∂ + ∂ ∂     
= + −     ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ −      
  ∂ + ∂ ∂   
= + −    ∂ ∂ ∂ −     
 
Notice that this equation is identical to the first-best first order condition for transfers 
except for the additional term on the right hand side, which we will denote A.   
 To sign the additional term A, we will sign each of the two bracketed terms that 
comprise A.  Since ∂P/∂I>0, the sign of the first bracketed term depends on the sign of 
∂I/∂T, the change in the Nash equilibrium investment level given a change in transfers.  
We can state the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: Higher transfers decrease each region’s Nash Equilibrium level of 
investment, that is ∂I/∂T<0. 
Proof: The proof proceeds by first deriving the direction of the shift in the reaction 
function when T changes.  We show the reaction function shifts down when T increases.  
Given symmetry, both reaction functions shift by the same amount in the same direction, 
and since the reaction functions are downward sloping, such a shift results in lower 
investment by both regions in the new Nash Equilibrium.  To derive the sign of the shift 
in the reaction function, we can again use the implicit function theorem as above.  The 
change in the reaction function when T changes is: 
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(16) T
I
dI
dT
φ
= − φ  
 We have already shown that ϕI is negative (see above).  Hence, the sign of the shift of 
the reaction function is the same as the sign of ϕT.  To derive ϕT, differentiate (8) with 
respect to T: 
 
( ) ( )(8 ') ( *) (1 *( *))L HT
u uP PY T Y TP I P I
I T I T
∂ + ∂ −∂ ∂φ =− + −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
To sign this derivative note first that 
( ) ( )0 and 0L Hu uY T Y T
T T
∂ + ∂ −
> <
∂ ∂
 
Since ∂P/∂I>0, both terms of (8’) are negative.  Hence ϕT is negative and the reaction 
function shifts down; symmetry implies the same is true of the reaction function (8*).  
Since both reaction functions are downward sloping and shift down, the Nash 
Equilibrium level of investment of each region decreases with increases of T.  QED. 
 Given proposition 1, the first bracketed term of A is negative.  The sign of the 
second bracketed term of A depends on the relationship between P/(1-P) and 
u(YH)/u(YL).  The second bracketed term of A will be positive iff ( ) 1( )
H
L
u Y P
u Y P
−
>  and 
negative iff ( ) 1( )
H
L
u Y P
u Y P
−
<  .  For interpretation it is useful to note that the second 
bracketed term is negative if expected utility in the low-income state is greater than 
expected utility in the high-income state. 
 We are now in a position to evaluate the sign of A.   
Proposition 2: The sign of the term A is negative iff ( ) 1( )
H
L
u Y P
u Y P
−
>   and positive iff 
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( ) 1
( )
H
L
u Y P
u Y P
−
<  .   
Proof:  Since the first term of A is negative, A will be negative iff the second bracketed 
term is positive and A will be positive iff the second bracketed term is negative.  The 
proposition follows immediately since the second bracketed term is positive iff 
( ) 1
( )
H
L
u Y P
u Y P
−
>   , and the second bracketed term is negative iff ( ) 1( )
H
L
u Y P
u Y P
−
<  .  QED. 
 As we have evaluated the sign of A, we are in a position to compare first and 
second-best transfers.  We can state the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: Optimal second-best transfers will be less than optimal first-best transfers 
iff ( ) 1( )
H
L
u Y P
u Y P
−
>  (that is, expected utility in the high-income state is greater than 
expected utility in the low-income state). Optimal second-best transfers will be greater 
than first-best transfers iff ( ) 1( )
H
L
u Y P
u Y P
−
<  (that is, expected utility in the low-income 
state is greater than expected utility in the high-income state). 
Proof:   
Given Proposition 2, Proposition 3 follows from examination of the first-order conditions 
for second-best transfers (15) and the first-order conditions for first-best transfers (2).  
QED. 
 A graphical depiction can be provided by reference to Figure 1.  We have noted 
that (15) is identical to (2) except for the additional term on the right hand side denoted 
A.  This additional term is added to the marginal utility of income for the region that 
suffers a low income shock.  If A is positive, more weight is given to the marginal utility 
of the region suffering from the low-income shock than under the first-best so the 
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marginal utility line of the starred region in figure 1 is shifted up and transfers are higher.  
If A is negative, less weight is given to the marginal utility of the region suffering the 
low-income shock than under the first-best, the marginal utility of the starred region 
shifts down, and transfers are lower.  These possibilities are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 The surprising result that second-best transfers can be greater than first-best 
transfers starts from the fact that the central government has two somewhat conflicting 
goals that it is trying to balance.  One is to redistribute income to equalize marginal 
utilities.  The other is to correct for under-investment.  However, from the ex-ante 
perspective changing transfers that impact investment also impact the probability of the 
(YL, Y*L ) and (YH, Y*H ) outcomes, even though no transfers are made in these 
situations ex-post.  When the expected utility of both regions ending up with high income 
is greater than the expected utility of both regions ending up with low income, we get the 
intuitive result that the central government decreases its redistributive grants in order to 
increase investment.  Lower transfers increase the probability of (YH, Y*H ) which has a 
greater expected utility in this case.  However, if expected utility is higher for the (YL, 
Y*L ) outcome than for the (YH, Y*H ) outcome, the central government can induce the 
higher expected utility (YL, Y*L ) outcome by giving more transfers because this lowers 
investment and hence makes the (YL, Y*L ) possibility more likely.   
 It is perhaps this contrast between second- and first-best transfers that 
distinguishes the disaster case from other shocks to regional incomes. Disasters are by 
definition low probability, high-cost events that would typically result in very large 
shocks to regional income and utility. More common, lower cost shocks – perhaps like 
those associated with regional business cycles – are those in which second-best transfers 
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may exceed first-best. 
 
V. Commitment and Ex-post Central Government Grants 
 
 Up to this point, we have assumed that the central government commits to the 
second-best ex-ante optimal transfers derived in the previous section.  However, second-
best transfers that are smaller than first-best transfers require the central government to 
effectively ex-ante commit to punish regions that end up with a disaster in order to 
increase the incentive of regions to invest in protective infrastructure and thereby lessen 
the costs of the disaster.  But there is a real question concerning the credibility of the 
central government commitment.  If the central government cannot credibly commit, a 
different and distinct reason for underinvestment in protective infrastructure will arise: 
the anticipation by a region that ex-post transfers from the central government can be 
influenced by its investment choices.  Given this, the region can exploit the anticipated 
reaction of the central government (effectively exploiting a soft budget constraint) and 
further under-invest in protective infrastructure. 
 To model this, we consider the central government’s choice of transfers from an 
ex-post perspective.  We maintain our normative framework and assume that the central 
government’s objective function is the sum of regions’ utilities.  Ex-post, the central 
government chooses transfers to maximize  
{ , , ( , ), }
(17) ( ) ( )Max *
rs
rs rssr
 T r s L H r s
  u uT TYY
∈ ≠
+ + −  
The first order conditions are: 
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Ex-post, the central government will not implement second-best transfers; rather, it will 
want to equate the marginal utility across regions, which implies that it wants to equalize 
incomes ex-post.  Ex-post optimal transfers are thus 
* *(19) ,
2 2
H L H L
LH HL
Y Y Y YT T− −= =  
 Before we consider a region’s ex-ante investment decision, we note that ex-ante a 
region predicts these ex-post transfers to be 
( *) * (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( *)) *(20) ,
2 2
H L H L
LH HL
P I Y P I Y P I Y P I Y
τ τ
− − − −
= =  
The regions realize that their ex-ante behavior will change the predicted ex-post transfer 
since greater investment is going to increase the probability of a high income outcome 
and decrease the probability of a low income outcome, and each region would want to 
take this into account in its ex-ante investment decision.  Differentiating the predicted ex-
post transfers yields: 
1 1(21) 0;
2 2
HL LH
H L
P PY Y and
I I I I
τ τ∂ ∂∂ ∂
= > = >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
1 1(21*) * * 0
* 2 * * 2 *
LH HL
H L
P PY Y
I I I I
τ τ∂ ∂∂ ∂
= > = >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 
Hence, higher investment increases the predicted transfer paid in the event of a high 
income outcome by more than it increases the predicted transfer received in the event of a 
low income outcome.  This is a type of soft budget constraint. 
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 Now consider the ex-ante investment decision of the unstarred region when it 
realizes that the central government will implement the optimal ex-post transfers.  The 
region’s investment decision will solve: 
( )Max
( ) ( *) ( )
(22) ( )(1 ( *) ( )
(1 ( )) ( *) ( )
(1 ( ))(1 ( *)) ( )
 I
H
HLH
LHL
L
 v Y I  
 P I P I u Y
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τ
τ
−
+
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The first order condition is: 
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∂ ∂
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To derive the slope of the reaction function, write the reaction function defined by (23) in 
implicit form, φ(I, I*, τ) = 0.  Using the implicit function theorem, the slope of the 
reaction function for the unstarred region is: 
*(24)
*
I
I
dI
dI
ϕ
ϕ
= −  
We can show that φI is negative.  To see this note that φI is: 
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Given the assumed symmetry of the regions, we can show that the sum of the sixth and 
eighth terms is zero.  To see this, note that adding terms six and eight yields 
2
2
( ((26) (1 ) H Lu Y u YP P
I
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But from the central government’s first order conditions, the region knows that the 
central government will equate marginal utilities ex-post, so (26) is zero.  Hence, (25) 
reduces to 
[ ] [ ]
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The first two terms are identical to the corresponding derivative associated with the 
reaction function defined by equation (8).  As with that derivative, given that YH > YL + 
T and P’’(I)<0, the first two terms are negative.  The second two terms are also negative 
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since P’(I)>0, ∂u(YH – τ)/∂τ < 0, ∂u(YL + τ)/∂τ > 0,  and ∂τ/∂I>0.  The sign of the fifth 
and sixth terms depend on the sign of the cross partials ∂u2(YL + τ)/∂τ∂I and ∂u2(YH - 
τ)/∂τ∂I.  These are negative since ∂u2(YL + τ)/∂τ∂I = (∂u2(YL + τ)/∂τ2)*(∂τ/∂I) < 0 and 
∂u2(YH - τ)/∂τ∂I = -(∂u2(YH - τ)/∂τ2)*(∂τ/∂I) < 0.  Intuitively a higher investment level 
increases the expected transfer which increases utility at a decreasing rate.  As the other 
parts of the fifth and seventh terms are positive, these two terms must be negative.  As all 
the terms are negative, φI < 0. 
 The derivative φI* is 
[ ] [ ]*
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The first two terms are identical to the corresponding derivative associated with the 
reaction function defined by equation (8).  We have already shown that concavity of the 
utility function implies that the sum of these two terms is negative.  Given the assumed 
symmetry of the regions, we can show that the sum of terms three and five is zero and the 
same for the sum of terms four and seven.  To see this, note that adding terms three and 
five yields 
( ((28) ' L Hu Y u YP P
I
∂ + τ) ∂ − τ)∂ τ  
− + ∂ ∂τ ∂τ 
 
But from the central government’s first order conditions, the region knows that the 
central government will equate marginal utilities ex-post, so (28) is zero.  The same is 
true when we sum terms four and seven.  Hence, (27) reduces to 
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The third and fourth terms are negative since ∂u(YH – τ)/∂τ < 0, ∂u(YL + τ)/∂τ > 0,  and 
∂τ/∂I*>0. Hence, φI* < 0.  As both φI* and φI are negative, the slope is negative. 
 To make sure that the reaction functions intersect, we impose the condition that 
when a region’s investment is zero, the marginal benefit of investment for that region is 
greater than the marginal cost.  A sufficient condition for the resulting Nash Equilibrium 
to be asymptotically stable is that the absolute value of the slope is less than 1.  This 
requires φI* < φI which, using the above derivatives, requires 
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Given symmetry, the last two terms on the left hand side of the inequality are equal to the 
last two terms on the right hand side of the inequality.  Hence (29) simplifies to 
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The right hand side of the inequality can be further simplified because the last two terms 
can be written as: 
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As above, from the central government’s first order conditions the region knows that the 
central government will equate marginal utilities ex-post, so the bracketed term is zero 
and (29’) reduces to 
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This is identical to the condition for asymptotic stability with respect to the reaction 
function defined by (8) except for the addition of the last term (which is negative).  As we 
are concerned with the absolute value, the addition of this term increases the absolute 
value of the right hand side of the inequality.  Hence the sufficient condition for 
asymptotic stability is somewhat eased relative to the reaction function defined by (8). 
 The analogous first-order condition for the starred region is: 
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Solving (23*) for I* yields the reaction function of the starred region, and the symmetry 
of the problem implies that the two reaction functions are also symmetric.  Hence, the 
above discussion of the unstarred region’s reaction function applies equally to the starred 
region’s reaction function, which is downward sloping.  The Nash Equilibrium levels of 
investment that simultaneously solve these two first order conditions would be identical 
for each region.   
 We can compare investment levels to the earlier case by reference to Figure 2.  
We show that the reaction functions pictured in Figure 2 are both lower.  The first two 
terms of (23) and (23*) are the same as equations (8) and (8*) from before, so from our 
previous analysis we know that there will be an incentive to under-invest because of the 
externality.  We now have two additional terms to analyze, however.  The second two 
terms on the left-hand side of (23) and (23*) arise from the fact that the regions know that 
ex-post transfers will be affected by its’ investment decision.  We can sign these terms 
because we know that ∂u/∂τHL < 0 and ∂u/∂τLH > 0 in (23) and ∂u*/∂τHL > 0 and ∂u*/∂τLH 
< 0 in (23*).  The remaining parts of the two additional terms in (23) and (23*) are 
positive, so the third term is negative and the fourth is positive.  Furthermore, we know 
from (21) and (21*) that the negative term is larger than the positive term so the sum of 
the two additional terms of (23) and (23*) is negative, and the marginal benefit of 
investment is lower than in (8) and (8*).  The reaction functions pictured in Figure 2 are 
therefore both lower and thus the Nash equilibrium investment levels are also lower.  
This is the effect of each region’s exploitation of the anticipated central government 
transfers (the anticipation of a type of soft budget constraint).  As it undertakes its ex-ante 
investment decision, the region realizes that the central government will have an 
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incentive to equalize incomes ex-post and each region consequently has less incentive to 
invest.  In the Nash Equilibrium, as both regions anticipate the central government 
response, both will further under-invest in protective infrastructure relative to the initial 
non-cooperative Nash Equilibrium. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This paper has studied a model of federalism which highlights the tradeoff 
between providing appropriate incentives for protection at the local level and insuring 
actual losses after a disaster occurs. Our results indicate that when regional governments 
undertake disaster prevention measures and act non-cooperatively, federal disaster 
insurance will result in underinvestment in pre-disaster protective investment. As in 
Persson and Tabellini (1996), centralization of the provision of protective infrastructure 
would eliminate inefficiency by eliminating the moral hazard.  Unobservable or 
unverifiable local efforts to prevent disasters makes typical externality prescriptions (such 
as matching grants) difficult to implement.  
When the relative probability of a disaster is low, second-best federal transfers 
involve rewarding the successful avoidance of disasters. But the effectiveness of such a 
regime requires credible ex-ante commitment by the federal government. This 
commitment may be difficult to sustain. Again, the evidence provides some support to 
this result.  In recent years, initial Congressional appropriations to the Disaster Relief 
Fund have been heavily supplemented after disasters have occurred (see Chart 1). When 
the central government cannot commit to the second-best transfers and  regions anticipate 
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ex-post equalizing transfers, they will further under-invest to influence anticipated future 
transfers, taking advantage of a type of soft budget constraint. 
Unfortunately, we believe that current US disaster policies may be susceptible to 
the dual problems of unverifiable local investment and a federal inability to commit to 
solutions that would lower the moral hazard problem. In particular, since information 
about local vulnerability – and which protective investments actually reduce this 
vulnerability - is likely to be most easily available to regional officials, the principal 
responsibility for protective investment falls on state and local governments. Meanwhile, 
a large share of post-disaster relief funds comes from the federal fisc. Our model suggests 
that in this institutional environment states have significant incentives to underinvest in 
protective infrastructure.  
Steinberg’s (2000, pp 103-111) account of the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) is an example of the incentives of unverifiable local investment at work. The 
NFIP, adopted in 1968, offers insurance to residents of 100-year floodplains at heavily 
subsidized rates. In exchange, local officials were to increase protection by requiring that 
new structures be built above the 100-year flood level. Yet in the interest of economic 
development, officials in some locations granted numerous variances to these regulations, 
leading to ever-expanding claims on the flood insurance program.  
While the model presented here provides preliminary insights into the nature of 
the problems raised by natural disasters, we see several directions in which this work 
could be extended. Here we describe two of these. Both of these extensions may add 
some richness to the findings reported here, but we believe that neither is likely to reverse 
our main conclusions. 
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We model regional government investment in protective infrastructure, but 
another major source of risk mitigation by state and local government consists of 
regulations: building codes, land use restrictions and the like. Such regulations are often 
seen from the state perspective as diminishing local economic growth, implying that our 
modeling assumption captures the basic issue. Nonetheless, explicit treatment of the 
choice between structural and regulatory mitigation techniques might yield more nuanced 
insights.  
A second possible extension concerns the potential for spillovers from protective 
investments. In the case of flood control, for example, structures built to prevent flooding 
in one location can increase their probability in others. A well-known example is levees 
on the Mississippi River, which force flood waters to other, unprotected, locations. 
Generalizing the model to account for such externalities in the effects of protective 
investments will allow a more complete examination of the issues. 
The problems raised by geographically-concentrated shocks to income, regardless 
of their probability and magnitude, are difficult to solve. We study a simple model that 
we believe captures features of US disaster policy. In our model, sub-national under-
provision of disaster protection will result first from full federal ex-ante insurance.  
Second-best transfers can be devise to reduce the problem of  sub-optimal investment, but 
these suffer from a time-consistency problem.   If regions anticipate the time-consistent 
policy of equalizing transfers, their exploitation of this type of soft budget constraint will 
result in a further reduction in sub-national protective infrastructure investment. The 
challenge is to provide appropriate incentives for local protective actions, whether 
regulatory or structural, while maintaining the benefits of insurance against large shocks. 
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This is a difficulty that has bedeviled disaster policy makers for generations. Rewarding 
successful avoidance of disasters is one path to the constrained optimum. Achieving 
these benefits, however, requires more post-disaster discipline on the part of Congress 
than it has historically demonstrated. 
32
REFERENCES 
 
Bayoumi, Tamim, and Paul Masson, 1995. “Fiscal Flows in the United States and 
Canada: Lessons for Monetary Union in Europe,” European Economic Review 39,  
pp. 253-74. 
 
Bea, Keith, 2005. “Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations,  
 Eligible Activities, and Funding,” CRS Report to Congress. 
 
Bordignon, Massimo, Paolo Manasse and Guido Tabellini, 2001, “Optimal 
regional redistribution under asymmetric information,” American Economic 
Review, 91 , 709-723. 
 
Caplan, Arthur J., Richard C. Cornes and Emilson C. D. Silva 2000. “Pure public goods 
and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and 
imperfect labor mobility” Journal of Public Economics, Volume 77, Issue 2, pp. 
265-284. 
 
Chernick, H. 2001. “The Fiscal Impact of 9/11 on New York City” in Resilient City: 
The Economic Impact of 9/11, H. Chernick ed., 295-320. New York, NY: Russell 
Sage. 
 
Goodspeed, Timothy, 2002. “Bailouts in a Federation,” International Tax and Public  
 Finance 9, pp.409-421, August. 
 
von Hagen, Jurgen, 2007. “Achieving Economic Stabilization by Sharing Risk within 
 Countries.” in Robin Boadway and Anwar Shah, eds. Intergovernmental Fiscal 
 Transfers: Principles and Practice.  Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Kunreuther, Howard, 2006. “Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural Disaster  
 Insurance?” in On Risk and Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, Ronald  
 Daniels, Donald Kettl and Howard Kunreuther, eds. Philadelphia: University of  
 Pennsylvania Press.  
 
Lockwood, Ben. 1999. “Inter-regional insurance,” Journal of Public Economics,72(1 ),1 -
37. 
 
Melitz, Jacques and Frederic Zumer, 2002. “Regional redistribution and stabilization by  
 the center in Canada, France, the UK and the US: A reassessment and new tests,”  
 Journal of Public Economics 86, pp. 263-286. 
 
Oates, Wallace.  2005. “Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism” 
International Tax and Public Finance, 12, 349–373. 
 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, 1996. “Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing  
33
 and Moral Hazard,” Econometrica 64, pp. 623-646. 
 
Raff, Horst and J.D. Wilson. 1997. “Income redistribution with well-informed local 
governments.” International Tax and Public Finance 4, 407-427. 
 
Steinberg, Ted, 2000. Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in  
 America, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Walters, Jonathan and Donald Kettl, 2006. “The Katrina Breakdown,” in On Risk and 
 Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, Ronald Daniels, Donald Kettl and  
 Howard Kunreuther, eds. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.  
 
Wildasin, D.E. 2007. “Disaster Policy in the US Federation: Intergovernmental  
Incentives and Institutional Reform,” National Tax Association, Proceedings of 
the 99th Annual Conference, 171–178. 
 
Wildasin, D.E. 2008a. “Disaster Policies: Some Implications for Public Finance in the  
 U.S. Federation,” Public Finance Review 36 (4), 497-518. 
 
Wildasin, David, 2008b. “Disaster Avoidance, Disaster Relief, and Policy Coordination  
 in a Federation,” Working Paper, University of Kentucky. 
 
Zeckhauser, Richard, 2006. “Floods, Fires, Earthquakes and Pine Beetles: JARring 
  Actions and Fat Tails,” presentation at Berkeley Symposium on Real Estate,  
 Catastrophic Risk and Public Policy, available at  
 http://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/Presentations/zeckhauser.ppt, last accessed  
 September 1, 2006. 
34
Figure 1 
Optimal First-Best Transfer for (YH, Y*L) case 
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Figure 2 
Nash Equilibrium Regional Investment 
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Figure 3 
Second-Best Transfers can be Greater or Less than First-Best Transfers 
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Chart 1 
Disaster Relief Fund Appropriations
Fiscal Years 1974-2005
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